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Revue d'Hisloire de l'Universile de Balamand 
Numero 35, 20 17, ISSN 16087526 
REPORTING FROM THE CITY: VIGNETIES FROM 
CONSTANTINOPLE IN THE DISPATCHES OF LORD 
STRANGFORD DURING THE EASTERN CRISIS OF THE 18208 
THEOPHILUS C. PROUSIS' 
The tangled web of the Eastern Question became the single most 
explosive force in European great power politics during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, and Constantinople became the epicenter 
of this contentious dispute in Ottoman-European relations. Eyewitness 
commentaries by diplomats, travelers, residents, and others who visited this 
fabled city conveyed images and episodes about various topics, including 
European interactions with the Ottoman Empire, European designs on 
contested lands, and Ottoman politics and policy. These scenes and stories 
not only shed light on the geopolitical heart of the Eastern Question but also 
reinforce the centrality of this volatile issue in the relationship between the 
Ottoman Empire and Europe. 
The Eastern crisis of the 1820s provides the setting for this selection 
of vignettes from the correspondence of Lord Strangford (LS for short), 
Britain 's ambassador at the Sublime Porte from 1821 to 1824. At a tense 
but pivotal moment in Ottoman history, his prolific letters to the London 
Foreign Office detailed the intertwined challenges facing the regime of 
Sultan Mahmud II and rendered colorful anecdotes on the atmosphere 
in Constantinople, the Empire's crown jewel situated on two continents. 
Rebellion erupted in Greece. War loomed between Russia and Turkey. 
Restrictions dislocated European trade. Sectarian reprisal and religious 
violence spread. Janissaries undercut the sultan 's political and military 
I Department of History, Uni versity of North Florida, Jacksonville, Florida. 1 presented part of this 
essay as a conference paper at the Annual Convention of the Association for Slavic, East European, and 
Eurasian Studies, San Antonio, Texas, November 2014. 
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authority. And border clashes sparked a Turkish-Persian war. In depicting 
these and other pressures confronting the Ottoman Empire, LS chronicled an 
increasingly unstable situation.' His descriptions of the ramifications of the 
Greek War of Independence and wider Near Eastern upheaval underline the 
essential importance of diplomats in the history and historiography of the 
Eastern Question, that precarious maze of European intrigue, penetration, 
and power which embroiled the receding but resilient Ottoman Empire, still 
possessing strategic lands and waterways in the Levant. ' 
An invaluable resource on the diverse manifestations of the Eastern 
crisis, the copious dispatches of LS probed Russian-Ottoman relations, 
Black Sea commerce, the Danubian Principalities, Ottoman-Persian affairs, 
and a host of related matters. Not only did he represent and defend British 
interests in the Near East but, in the aftermath of the severance of Russian-
Ottoman official contacts in July 1821 , he interceded on behalf of Russian 
concerns regarding the evacuation of Ottoman troops from Moldavia and 
Wallachia, the restoration of unimpeded commerce in the Black Sea, and 
the protection of non-combatant Ottoman Greeks who did not take part in 
the Greek upri sing. With patience, tenacity, and tact, and with the trust of 
Tsar Alexander I, the British ambassador averted a Russian-Turkish war and 
sought to reso lve unsettled Russian-Ottoman differences, a precondition 
for the renewal of diplomatic exchanges between the two countries. 
[n cooperation with fellow European envoys, he called for restraint and 
leniency on the part of the Ottoman government, advocating reconciliation 
with Russia and moderation toward the Greek insurgency. He filed regular 
reports on hi s protracted negotiations at the Porte- a treasure trove of 
underutilized archival material on the central disputes and disorders of 
the 1820s, resources that enhance not just our understanding of the multi-
2 LS's diplomatic correspondence, located in The National Archives, Kew, UK, inspired the design of 
my Srrangford project, a four-volume compil ation and analysis of his writings from Constantinople . 
The first three vo lumes have already appeared: Prousis 2010, 2012, 20 14a. These works, with the 
relevant bibl iography, include ample coverage of the combination of circumstances that produced and 
escalated the Eastern cri sis of the 1820s. Also see Aksan 2007: 180-342, Finkel 2005: 289-446, Faroqhi 
2006, Anscombe 2006, Phill iou 20 II. 
3 On the Greek revolt and its reverberations, see Aksan 2007: 285-305, Brewer 2003, Pizanias 2011 , 
Dakin 1973. With emphasis on the repercussions of the Greek uprising for Russian-Ottoman relations, 
see Prousis 1994 and 2002, and Frary 2015. For the most recent examination of the Eastern Quest ion , 
see the collection of essays edited by Frary and Kozelsky 20 14. Also see Schumacher 20 14, and Prousis 
2014a: 34 1-42 (note #37), for additional sources. 
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faceted Eastern conflict but also our perception of Ottoman politics' 
Partial success crowned his steadfast efforts, as war clouds between 
Russia and Turkey seemingly passed and diplomacy facilitated the rebuilding 
of stable bonds. The sultan vowed to repair damaged Greek churches and to 
safeguard the life and property of non-combatants; he gave public testimonies 
of respect for the Greek ecumenical patriarch and amnestied rebels who 
submitted to Ottoman jurisdiction. The Porte also promised to lift Ottoman 
restrictions on Russian shipping in the Black Sea and to withdraw at least 
some Ottoman troops from the Danubian Principalities. Indeed, Russia's 
foreign secretary (Karl V. Nesselrode) acknowledged that the Ottoman 
government had removed the major hurdles to the return of a Russian envoy to 
Constantinople.5 No other European diplomat did more to eliminate virtually 
every cause of Russian irritation and to satisfy Russia's legitimate claims, and 
the staunch exertions of Britain's ambassador continued to pave the way for 
the rekindling of direct Russian-Ottoman ties. 
In addition to his lengthy accounts of his diplomacy, LS commented 
on daily events and human interest stories, observations that capture some 
of the drama at the grassroots and policy-making levels of society. These 
impressions of ordinary and extraordinary occurrences in the Ottoman 
capital, such as prophecies, fires, janissaries, and factions, attest to the range 
and clarity of his narratives, not to mention the breadth of topics addressed 
in his communiques. Rich in texture, nuance, and specificity, his snapshots 
illumine the overlapping problems at the crux of the Eastern crisis and evoke 
the flavor of life at a tumultuous time in the biography of Constantinople, 
that metropolis on the Bosporus which stood for centuries as an imperial 
crossroads and battleground6 
4 On the various issues in LS's extended deliberations with Ottoman officials and other European 
envoys, see Prousi s 2010, 2012, 20 14a. Also see Cunningham I 993a: 188-232, Florescu 1997: 123-
47. See Nichols 197 1: 48-54, 244-58, on the discussions of the great powers at Vienna and Verona to 
resolve the Greek disturbance and other quarrels in the Near East. It was at the Congress of Verona 
in November 1822 that the tsar entrusted LS, who left his post to attend these talks, with the delicate 
task of negotiating with the Porte on behalf of Russia. On British policy toward the Greek rising and 
the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s, see Webster 1934: 349-86, Temperley 1966: 319-26, Crawley 1930. 
s Cunningham 1993a: 223, Prousis 2014a: 9. 
to For three excellent portrayals of the Ottoman capital, drawing on multi- layered resources such as 
diaries, letters, memoirs, travel literature, diplomatic accounts, and other contemporary writings, see 
Mansel 1998. with a good section on the reign and era of Sultan Mahmud II (233-60), Kelly 2005, 
Freely 1998 (especially 253-65). 
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In a fascinating account of 28 February 1823, LS shared a prevalent 
Ottoman view that the unfolding troubles of the Empire perhaps came from 
none other than the Prophet Muhammad, whose sacred relics in Constantinople 
underscored the supremacy of the sultan-caliph in the Ottoman world. "The 
events which most commonly embellish our existence at Constantinople," 
LS wrote, "have, during the last fortnight, been remarkably abundant and 
diversified. We have had severa l storms- an earthquake- much strangling of 
janissaries- various fires- and not a few cases of plague. To these may be added 
the novelty of a direct communication from Paradise, in the shape of a letter 
from the Prophet Mahomet to Sultan Mahmud [II]." Discovered at the sacred 
tomb in Mecca, the letter bore the address of the sultan and the signature ofthe 
prophet. Presented to the sultan by the conductor of the religious pilgrimage 
to Islam's holy cities, this missive "declares [the prophet's] indignation at the 
mismanagement of his imperial vicegerent- represents in strong terms, the 
decay of true Islamism- adverts to the indescribable horror and confusion 
which he felt on being abruptly, and somewhat unkindly, informed by the 
Angel Gabriel, that of seventy thousand Musulmans who had perished in battle 
within the last two years, only forty-seven had been allowed to enter the gates 
of heaven." The prophet concluded with a grim warning, "which has often 
(and in other quarters) been made before, and to which the sultan must now 
be pretty well accustomed, that the Empire of the Crescent cannot possibly 
last thirty years longer." Many versions of this letter supposedly existed, but 
"the one which I have the honour to transmit, is probably as near to the truth 
as any of the others." Because "this ridiculous story" would probably appear 
in European philhellenic periodicals, "under the head of authentic intelligence 
from Constantinople," LS felt compelled not to withhold this incident, "however 
trifting and absurd," from the knowledge of the Foreign Office.' 
A prophecy of another sort pervades part of the LS message of I 0 March 
1823, which opens with the statement that "[one] of those sudden changes 
which so frequently take place in the administration ofthis country, has this 
7 All the LS documents for this essay are located in the Foreign Office holdings of The National 
Archives, Kew (TNA, FO). In most matters of word ing, grammar, punctuation, and citation of 
numbers, [ have retained LS's fonnat, including his archaisms and inconsistent spellings. When the 
manuscript has a word underlined for emphasis, I have placed it in bold print. On plague outbreaks in 
Constant inople, Smyrna, and other parts of the Ottoman Empire, see Panzac 1985 and Bulmus 20 12. 
On the purported letter from the Prophet Muhammad to Su ltan Mahmud II, see INA, FO 78/ 114, ff. 
140-423,28 February 1823 (No. 20). Prou,i, 2014a: 6\-62. 
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day occurred." The appointment of a new grand vizier, Silahdar Ali Pasha, 
boded well for a beleaguered Empire because "[this] individual is considered 
to be gifted with remarkable talents, and to possess such activity, energy, and 
resource (and no small portion of these qualities is requisite at this moment) 
as amply fit him for the dangerous dignity to which he has been raised." But 
we learn that the hasty dismissal of the former grand vizier (Deli Abdullah 
Pasha), and the selection of a new one, resulted from the prediction of Turkish 
and Jewish court astrologers. Some extraordinary but unspecified change, the 
astrologers envisioned, wou ld take place in the Empire on this very day. By 
way of "rendering this prophecy as harmless as possible," the sultan decided 
to select "this fated day for the deposition of his vizier. The skill and foresight 
of the astrologers have thus been completely justified and confirmed-and it 
may be supposed that they are not among the persons least satisfied with the 
recent change."8 
Bad weather, natural disasters, and fires signified omens of disarray 
and divine disfavor in the realm of the sultan. On the night of 3 February 
1823, "one of the most violent hurricanes ever known in this city" blew down 
two minarets of the Grand Mosque (Hagia Sophia), "a circumstance well-
calculated to alarm the superstitious inhabitants of Constantinople.'" Five 
months later, in early July 1823, the environs of the capital were "ravaged 
by prodigious quantities of locusts- a visitation which had not occurred here 
for nearly fifty years. " Not surprisingly, the "Turks look upon this calamity as 
peculiarly ominous, and recourse has been had to public prayers in the chief 
mosques ."lO Recurrent fires erupted in the capital, but "[the] most tremendous 
conflagration which has ever been known in this residence, took place" on I 
March 1823. "The weather being uncommonly tempestuous, the flames raged 
with the utmost violence for twenty-six hours," enveloping the Tophana, 
Galata, and Pera neighborhoods. Ottoman estimates of destroyed dwellings 
and other buildings ranged from twelve thousand to over fifteen thousand. 
"The houses of all the foreign ministers [ambassadors and envoys] were more 
or less threatened, and our anxiety and alarm are not to be described, as the 
slightest change of wind to the northward, would have wrapped this quarter 
in flames ." Remarkably, according to LS, "not one house belonging to, or 
• TNA. FO 78/114, fT. 169-71., 10 March 1823 (No. 24). Prou, i, 2014.: 65. 
9TNA, FO 78/114, ff. 41-43a, 10 February 1823 (No. 7). Prousis 2014a: 46. 
'" TNA, FO 78/115, fT. 196-99, 10 Ju ly 1823 (No. 82). Prousi, 2014.: 142. 
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occupied by Christians, suffered in the late terrible conflagration," a fateful 
happening that "has produced a very strong impression upon the Turks." The 
general population loudly proclaimed "that this calamity is a visitation of 
Providence, in vengeance for the atrocities committed at Chios; and even 
the ministers of the Porte avow that they consider it as a mark of divine 
displeasure."11 
A less extensive fire, on 13 July 1823, caused much more damage, 
especially in the area near the Imperial Arsenal. Raging for ten hours without 
interruption, and at the mercy of a violent wind, the conflagration spread to 
"the dockyards, where it consumed a quantity of ship timber" and several 
naval vessels. The fire 's path "on this side of the harbour was at last checked, 
by the stone walls which surround the kapudan pasha's [grand admiral's] 
garden." What caused this disaster? "The fire broke out in the cottage of a 
poor woman, who had incautiously thrown a piece of lighted touchwood, 
which she believed to have been extinguished, into a press, where some 
linen and clothes were deposited. " 12 At least some of the fires in the capital 
were "the work of the janissaries, among whom a more than usual degree of 
discontent and turbulence prevails at this moment."" On another occasion (II 
August 1823), the dissatisfaction of the janissaries manifested itself in "the 
various attempts which are continually made to set fire to the city. Several 
fires evidently not accidental, have lately broken out in different quarters 
of Constantinople." The incendiaries in general escaped, but a Greek, who 
had recently converted to Islam, was not so fortunate: "detected in the act of 
placing combustibles in one of the bazaars, [he] was, after a very summary 
process, put to death."" 
li On the frequency of fires in Constantinople. largely caused by all the structures built of wood, see 
Mansel 1998: 186,224·25,239,249,286, 365, Kelly 2005: 26-27. On the conflagration of 1 March 
1823, see TNA, FO 78/ 114, f f. 165-67. , 10 M.rch 1823 (No. 23). Prous is 2014.: 63-64. This blaze 
swept through Pera, Galata, and the nearhy Tophana, site of the Imperial Foundry and Arsenal, and 
destroyed the bulk of suppl ies destined for Ottoman troops fighting on the Greek mainland. See the 
vivid sketch by the chaplain at the British embassy, Walsh 1836, vol. 2: 119-26. Finlay 1861 , vol. 
2: 5-6, stated that the fire paralyzed the sultan's preparations for the military campaign of 1823. LS 
recorded many observations on the Chios catastrophe of 1822 and its tragic aftennath. See Prousis 
20 12, 2014., 20 14b, Frary 20 14. 
12 TNA, FO 78/1 15, ff. 319-21 , 16 July 1823 (No. 93). Prousis 2014a: 163. Husrev (or Khosref) 
Mehemmed Pasha served as kapudan pasha, or grand admiral and commander of the Ottoman navy. 
On hi s nava l exploits during the Greek-Ottoman war, see the sources in Prousis 2014a: 344 (note #14). 
" TNA, FO 78/ 11 4, ff. 165-67., 10 M.rch 1823 (No. 23). Prou,is 20 14.: 64. 
" TNA, FO 78/ 11 6, ff. 25-28, 11 August 1823 (No. 103). Prousis 20 14.: 172. 
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Of all the domestic disturbances facing the Porte in the early I 820s, 
threats from the janissary corps were the most frequently cited danger, 
second only perhaps to the Greek uprising itself, in the writings of Britain's 
ambassador. In late February 1823, numerous ustaas, or leading officers of 
the janissaries, were "banished or secretly put to death" because of their 
harassment of the ecumenical patriarch (Anthimos III). The "seizure and 
exemplary punishment of these wretches" demonstrated the Porte's protection 
of "the security and dignity of the head of the Greek Church." The "utmost 
extremities" awaited all Muslims, "whatever their rank or office might be, 
who should fail in their respect to [the patriarch 's) sacred person."" 
The sultan 's appointment of a new aga or chief of the janissary corps 
convinced LS of an imminent showdown between the sultan and the fractious 
officers. The recently chosen commander, Huseyin Aga Pasha, "whose 
measures of severity are so extraordinary, and have so much the appearance 
of system," stirred the ambassador to imagine "that we are at the eve of some 
important crisis, during which the authority of the sultan and the power of the 
janissaries will be committed in actual conflict."" A subsequent note by LS 
(26 March 1823) praised the aga for displaying "the utmost vigour, ability, and 
resolution, in the execution of his office. At no period, perhaps, of. .. Ottoman 
history, have the janissaries been so completely humbled and subdued as at 
the present. The banishment of the refractory ustaas, still continues, and one 
by one, Constantinople will be delivered from those authors or promoters 
of all the mischief and all the disgraceful scenes which occurred here some 
months ago, and of which the sultan retains a very strong recollection. "17 
The seditious spirit and overweening reach of the janissaries permeated 
many of the epistles by LS, yet on II August 1823 he expressed confidence 
in "the great and essential services which [the aga) has rendered, in keeping 
that turbulent body under restraint-in suppressing the abuses practised by the 
ustaas-and, above all, in powerfully contributing to the success ofthose plans 
of reform in the military constitution ofthe janissaries, of which the sultan has 
never lost sight." Promoted to "the rank of a pasha of the first class," the aga 
aroused "as much discontent as alarm" among the janissaries. Indeed, he "has 
" TNA. FO 78/ 114. ff. 136-39,28 February 1823 (No. 19). Prollsis 2014a: 60. 
" TNA, FO 78/ 114, ff. 165-67a, 10 March 1823 (No. 23). Prollsis 2014a: 64. Aksan 2007: 31 5, on 
the newly chosen commander ofthejanissaries, who buttressed the sultan's modernizing aspiration to 
subdue the unruly units of this once elite corps. 
" TNA, FO 7811 14, ff. 21 3-1 5a, 26 March 1823 (No. 32). Prollsis 2014a: 75. 
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exhibited fresh proofs of his detennination to enforce the strictest discipline 
among the troops under his orders. The slightest offence is punished with death, 
and even so late as yesterday, three ustaas who were the principal leaders of 
the malcontents in their respective corps, were publickly strangled."" By the 
end of the year, the janissary aga received a strategic appointment, as pasha 
of Bursa and commander of the Bosporus. This nomination, LS wrote on 24 
December 1823, related directly to "that plan of subjugating the janissaries of 
which the sultan never loses sight, and which, r believe, occupies him more 
than any other consideration."" With the abolition of the janissaries in 1826, 
the sultan achieved his goal of ending the janissary threat as a precondition for 
initiating more systematic military and institutional refonns. 
Rivalries and divisions among top officials in the Ottoman government, 
another common theme in the LS reports, influenced the ambassador 's 
negotiations at the Porte. Based on his discussions with Ottoman authorities, 
and his close ties to several of them, LS voiced insider infonnation on Divan 
debates and disagreements over the appropriate response to the stalemate in 
Russian-Ottoman transactions. Seeking to avoid a Russian-Turkish war and 
to restart Russian-Ottoman official relations, he found a natural ally in the 
moderate or peace faction in the Divan. Yet the escalating Greek insurgence, 
and Russian complaints about Ottoman troops still occupying the Danubian 
Principalities and about Ottoman violations of commercial accords, gave the 
Divan 's belligerent or war party leverage with the sultan, at the expense of 
LS 's painstaking diplomacy to satisfY both Russian and Ottoman grievances. 
For example, in early February 1823 he cooperated with the reis efendi , or 
foreign minister, Mehmed Sadik Efendi, to advance a policy of conciliation 
with Russia. But the reis efendi " is strongly opposed by Husny Bey [director 
of the Imperial Mint], who is thought to be aiming at the post of reis efendi, 
and who is paying his court most assiduously to the sultan, by flattering the 
monarch's pride, and by declaiming against everything which may look like 
a concession to Russia."20 
" TNA. FO 7811 16, fT. 25-28, II August 1823 (No. 103). Prousis 2014.: 172. 
19 TNA, FO 7811 18, ff. 45·49, 24 December 1823 (No. 180). Prousis 2014a: 275. For more on the 
janissari es, including the sultan's assault on them in 1826, see Aksan 2007: 306·42. Kelly 2005: 253-
60. Freely 1998: 260-65; M.nseI1998: 220-39. 
20 TNA, FO 78/114, fT. 15-24a, 10 February 1823 (No. 3). Prousis 2014a: 41. The letters ofLS from 
182 1 through 1823 (Prousis 2010, 201 2, 2014a) repeatedly mentioned the high-ranking officials-the 
reis efendi, the kapudan pasha, the kiahya bey (minister of the interior), and others- with whom the 
ambassador conducted regular talks on Eastern affairs. 
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At the very same time, LS worked closely with the kapudan pasha, 
Husrev Mehemmed Pasha, exclaiming in their private and confidential 
conversation that "the deplorable and unpromising appearance of the affairs 
of this Empire" did not bode well for Ottoman success in a conflict with 
Russia. Additionally, "the progress made by the Greeks" and "the now proved 
insufficiency of the Turkish marine to cope with the naval armaments of the 
insurgents" constituted strong reasons "for hastening a reconciliation with 
Russia." The return of Russia's ambassador to Constantinople, LS affirmed, 
would deflate and discourage the Greeks, "inducing them to submit, deprived 
as they would then be of the hope of that powerful diversion in their favour, 
which a Russian war would have created." Receptive to this line of argument, 
the kapudan pasha had "very little inclination to measure his strength with the 
insurgent fleet" and did all that he could "to prevent the Porte from sending 
him to sea, and to try, in preference to a continuance of hostile operations, the 
effect of negotiation and a conciliatory policy, upon the minds of the Greeks."21 
LS developed amiable connections with perhaps the key spokesperson 
for the aggressive camp, Gianib (Salih) Efendi, the head of the sultan's palace 
police service. Opposed to the adoption of a mollifying system in foreign 
policy, Gianib was " incomparably, the ablest, though the most impracticable 
and intolerant, member of the Divan." Even his discharge from office in 
August 1823 did not dissuade LS of his prominence and sway in the Ottoman 
ruling establishment. "I fear that Gianib Efendi is too strongly fixed in the 
favour and confidence of his sovereign to be altogether excluded from his 
councils at this moment."" The prolonged miseries and misfortunes of the 
intensifying Greek-Ottoman war, and the still unresolved restoration of a 
formal relationship between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, only deepened 
the ambassador's frustration. This anxious and precarious situation, he 
apprehensively relayed on 4 November 1823, would become "a complete 
triumph to Gianib Efendi and to that party in the Divan who have always 
maintained the existence of a real connection between the Greek revolt and 
the policy of the Russian cabinet."" 
" TNA, FO 7811 14, ff. 26-28.,10 Febru.ry 1823 (No.4). Prousis 2014.: 42. 
n TNA, FO 78/ 116, ff. 85-86,25 August 1823 (No. 113). Prousis 2014.: 181. 
23 TNA, FO 781117, fT. 182-85,4 November 1823 (No. 156). Prousis 2014a: 243. See the British 
ambassador's many comments on the influential Gianib Efendi in Prousis 20 10, 20 12, 2014a. 
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The deadlock between Russia and Turkey fue led the Porte's "ill-
humour," a mood exacerbated by the acute sense of danger felt by those 
Ottoman ministers who had recommended a conciliatory stance to the 
sultan. After pursuing this policy, declared the LS letter of 26 May 1823, 
the sultan seemed to regret a course of action that "led to useless and 
unproductive sacrifice of his dignity. I have the means of positively knowing 
that the sultan spares neither reproaches nor menaces in his language to his 
ministers, whom he accuses of having deceived him by false assurances of 
the readiness of Russia to rekindle her friendly relations with this Empire 
provided, he (the sultan) made the first advances in the way of conciliation-
and that in particular, some intelligence (whether true or false I know not) 
which has lately reached the Porte, of a change in the Russian councils . .. has 
taught the Ottoman government to believe that the hopes of a cordial good 
understanding being effected between the two countries, are more distant 
than ever." The ramifications of this rift proved alarming, as the ambassador 
cogently claimed. 'The angry feelings of the sultan and the fears which they 
excite in his ministers, are, I am persuaded, the true causes of the late violent 
and unjustifiable proceedings towards the [four] Russian ships" confined in 
the harbor of Constantinople. Equally troubling, the Divan members who 
advocated compromise and concession "now tremble before the vindictive 
despot, who reproaches them with subserviency to Russia- and to escape 
from that reproach, and with the fear of the bowstring before their eyes, they 
are now advising a line of conduct decidedly opposite to that which has placed 
their lives in peril." 
Any favorable change, LS continued, depended on Russia furnishing "the 
only proof which will suffice to convince this government that she is sincere 
in her desire for peace," namely, the swift return of a Russian ambassador 
and the resumption of direct contacts between the two countries. Without this 
encouragement and support, the ministers who "have hitherto listened to the 
friendly counsel of the allies, and pledged themsel ves for its good rcsult," would 
be unwilling to continue to do so, "now that they perceive that the sacrifices 
which they have prevailed upon their master to make, are ineffectual, and that 
their own lives are endangered by the advice which they have given. On every 
ground of honour, policy, and interest, I conceive that Russia is bound to do 
something for those who have risqued everything for her."" 
"TNA. FO 7811 15. fT. 64-70 •• 26 May 1823 (No. 59). Prousis 20 14.: 113. 
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Factional strife seemingly worsened a fortnight later when LS reported 
on 10 June 1823 the sudden dismissal of the kiahya bey, or minister of the 
interior (Seydaa Efendi). This action validated the ambassador's apprehensions 
"that the ministers who have supported the opinions and advice of the allied 
missions at this residence, and who in consequence of that advice have urged 
the adoption of a conciliatory policy towards Russia, are now placed in a 
situation of extreme personal danger, by the utter failure of the expectations 
(in which they had taught their sovereign to indulge) that Russia would have 
met this change of system in a corresponding spirit of conciliation." The 
removal of the kiahya bey amounted to "an irreparable loss" because of "the 
talent, energy, and good principles, which distinguished him, and which are 
no longer available to the cause of peace" and because of "the discouragement 
which his fall must produce in the minds of those members of the Divan who 
have hitherto supported his opinions in the council." A casualty of factional 
politics, Seydaa Efendi lost his position as a result of "the vehemence with 
which he insisted upon the release ofthe four ships under the Russian flag, at 
present detained here. The strong language which he held in the Divan upon 
that subject, supplied his enemies with a fresh opportunity of representing 
him to the sultan as the devoted slave of Russia and ofthe Christian powers."25 
But Seydaa Efendi, and the moderate party, made a comeback by year's end. 
The impending arrival of Russian diplomatic representative Matvei Minciaky, 
LS recounted on 14 November 1823, would provide Ottoman ministers "with 
an opportunity of proving to the Divan and to the people, that there does 
really exist a disposition on the part of Russia to renew her ancient relations 
between the two countries. "2. 
Throughout hi s correspondence on Ottoman-Greek hostilities, LS 
discussed one of the striking realities of the Greek struggle for independence-
discord among Greek warriors and politicians. Fractures and cleavages, along 
regional , social, political, and ideological lines, precipitated internecine strife, 
eroded national unity, and confounded the process of nation-state bui Iding. 
" TNA , FO 7811 15, fT. 100-03, 10 June 1823 (No. 63). Pmus;, 20 14a: 119-20. 
26 TNA, FO 7811 17, ff.206-09, 14 November \823 (No. \58). Prousis 2014a: 246. On Minciaky 
(Minchaki in Russian bibliography), Russ ia's recently appointed consul-general in the Danubian 
Principal iti es, see the references in Prousis 2012, 2014a. Before he even started hi s consul-generalsh ip, 
Minciaky received a new assignment as commercial attache in Constantinople. Attached to the Russian 
embassy, he would supervise Russian trade interests, resolve commerc ial and other disagreements 
between Russ ia and Turkey, and expedite the renewal of their official relations. 
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"Fresh and most serious dissentions," he wrote on 26 March 1823, "have 
broken out among the chiefs at Missolonghi. Only four of the Greek blockading 
vessels have remained off Prevesa, and they have refused to continue there 
longer than fifteen days, unless the arrears of pay due to the crews should 
be discharged." This same dispatch described the disorder and confusion in 
Nauplion, where a mob of Greeks plundered the town 's treasury, housed in a 
local mosque. "The populace broke into the mosque .. . and seized everything 
which it contained, declaring that as the spoils of Tripolitsa, Navarino, and 
Corinth, had been di vided among the chiefs of the insurgents, it was but just 
that the common people should now have their share. I am assured that the 
amount of the property thus plundered, would have sufficed to maintain the 
Greek fleet for twelve months. "27 
LS and other European envoys, according to this letter of25 April 1823, 
endeavored "to divest the war of its character of ferocious barbarity, and to 
engage the Porte to cause its military operations against the insurgents to be 
preceded by offers of amnesty for the past and of security and clemency for 
the future." These efforts by Ottoman authorities had only limited success 
because of the Greeks' contradictory responses. "In every quarter where the 
amnesty proclaimed by the Porte has not been rejected by the Greeks, its 
conditions have been fa ithfully and honourably fulfilled." But the districts 
that acquiesced to this mercy were only "those which are removed from 
the immediate influence and controul of the unprincipled chiefs, who with 
singular indulgence, are considered throughout Europe as patriots, heroes, 
and sages, engaged in the glorious task of giving liberty and happiness to 
their country- while in that country they are well known to be men who 
have no object in view beyond the gratification of their own ambition, and the 
advancement of their own interests." The Greeks in general would willingly 
submit, "were it not for this fatal influence, and gladly would they return to 
their allegiance, and purchase by an unqualified acceptance of the Turkish 
proposals, an exemption from the miseries which thi s most deplorable 
insurrection has drawn down upon their suffering country." LS based thi s 
perspective "upon the information which reaches me, from every quarter, and 
which describes the Greek revolt, in its present stage, not as the effort of the 
27 TNA, FO 78/ 11 4, ff. 224·27, 26 March 1823 (No. 34). Prousis 20\4a: 77-78. Concise explanations of 
Greek military disunity and political fractiousness during the Greek revolt include the relevant sections 
of the studies by Dakin 1973, Beaton 2013. 
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general will-not as the struggle of the Greek nation to emancipate itself from 
Turkish oppression, but as the desperate game of ambitious individuals. I am 
well aware that this is not the light in which the Greek question is popularly 
considered, surrounded as it is with so many illusions of imagination and 
sympathy. "28 
With Ottoman forces launching another offensive in the region of 
Acarnania, LS stated on II August 1823, "the cause of the Greeks will certainly 
be again placed in the utmost danger." Any exertions that they might make to 
defend this area "would be rendered ineffectual by the unceasing jealousies 
and dissentions which distract their councils, and which subsist, as in ancient 
times, among the inhabitants of almost every separate township." Not confined 
to mainland Greece, these disputes "have lately again broken out at Hydra, 
where a conspiracy was formed by one of the contending parties, to deliver 
up the island to the Turkish fleet."" This "spirit of faction and disunion," LS 
asserted on 7 September 1823, "had never risen to such a pitch as now." The 
Greek military chieftain Theodore Kolokotroni faced charges from the Greek 
provisional government "for having embezzled tbe greater part of the booty at 
Nauplion," while Prince Alexander Mavrocordato had been obliged "to take 
refuge in Hydra, in consequence of his life having been endangered by the 
riva lry of his colleagues." Meanwhile, the Hydriote navy "is absolutely unable 
to put to sea, and the utmost discontent prevails among the sailors, who have 
received no pay from the government. The main hopes ofthe Greeks now rest 
upon the speedy arrival of money and arms from England."JO 
So many episodes emerge from the LS manuscripts, imparting to 
readers at least some ofthe human drama at the grassroots level ofthe Eastern 
crisis. In place of a conclusion, I will share three of these vignettes. On 20 
March 1823, "a numerous assembly of all the Jews resident at Constantinople, 
was held at the house of a principal banker of that nation, to consider the 
means of escaping from a severe infliction of the sultan's displeasure with 
which they were menaced." Their worry stemmed from the action taken by 
some of the Jews in Salonica: they passed along to the Greeks of that city 
letters from fellow Greeks in the Morea, "urging them [Salonica's Greeks] to 
" TNA, FO 7811 14, fT. 288-99, 25 Apri l 1823 (No. 46). Prousis 20 14a: 97-99. 
" TNA, FO 78/ 11 6, fT. 29-32, II August 1823 (No. 104). Prousis 20 14a: 173-74. 
30 TNA, FO 78/1 16, ff. 161·62, 7 September 1823 (No. 127). Prousis 20 14a: 205. For more on 
Kolokotroni and Mavrocordato, two of the major leaders of the Greek struggle, see the references in 
Prousis 2014a: 350 (note #6) and 361-62 (note # 12). 
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engage in the insurrection, and containing offers of speedy assistance from 
the government at Argos." Fearful that this circumstance would give the Porte 
a pretext for confiscating their property, the Jews of the capital "determined 
to avert the danger by a voluntary sacrifice. They have accordingly offered to 
rebuild at their own expense the three barracks, and the other public offices" 
destroyed by the previously cited conflagration that swept parts of the capital 
on I March 1823.31 
On the predicament of commercial restrictions affecting European 
navigation, Britain's ambassador expressed a glimmer of hope on II 
September 1823. "Almost all of those perplexing and vexatious regulations, 
and that multitude of petty (but in the aggregate) onerous charges on ships 
passing through the Bosporus, which have hitherto operated as positive 
impediments to the free exportation of Russian produce, are now abolished." 
This measure implied that Ottoman ministers "appear to have acted with a 
cordial and sincere desire to remove all grounds for just complaints on the 
part of Russia and the other European powers."" 
Lastly, in late Octobcr 1823, the British embassy successfully interceded 
for the release of eleven Russian monks detained in Adrianople, a clear sign of 
LS 's defense of Russian interests in the absence of an official Russian diplomatic 
mission at the Porte. The British consul in Adrianople (Pietro Duveluz) informed 
the embassy that eleven Russian monks, "belonging to one of the monasteries 
on Mount Lebanon, having arrived [in Adrianople] on their way to Russia, 
unprovided with Turkish passports, had been seized by order of the pasha 
(who supposed them to be Greek spies) and conducted them to prison." The 
consul pressed the pasha, who "permitted the unfortunate men to be released 
from prison" and then awaited orders from the Porte for the continuation of the 
monks ' journey to Russia. After LS conferred with the reis efendi, the grand 
vizier authorized the pasha of Adrianoplc "to give the requisite passports to the 
Russians, and to facilitate their journey to the frontier. " The Russian passports, 
"and other proofs of nationality, whieh were in the possession of the cleven 
priests, ... left no doubt of their being Russian subjects."J3 
31 TNA, FO 78/ 114, ff. 213-15a, 26 March 1823 (No. 32). Prousis 2014a: 75 . On Jewish communities 
in the Ottoman Empire, see the scholarship cited in Prousis 201 4a: 350 (note #3). For the Jews of 
Constantinople, also see Mansel 1998: 15-16, 123-28, 141-42,265, Mann 1982, Cohen 2014. 
" TNA, FO 7811 16, IT. 169·72, II September 1823 (No. 130). Prousis 20 14.: 208. 
n TNA, FO 781116, IT. 296·99, 25 October 1823 (No. 145). Prousis 2014. : 229. 
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The vast majority of LS documents, not just the selections for this 
essay, widen our lens on the Eastern Question- from a purely great-power 
military, naval, and diplomatic rivalry to a more complex, multi-dimensional 
contest. Indeed, European strategic, commercial, and religious objectives 
entwined with the unpredictable circumstances of the Ottoman Empire, 
including the shifting balance between moderate and militant factions in the 
Ottoman government. By suggesting the dynamics of Ottoman-European 
exchanges, the LS memoranda depict a more varied and animated picture of 
Europe's assorted interactions with the Ottoman Empire. By relating precise 
incidents of janissary unrest, Greek sedition, commercial di sarray, and public 
insecurity, his writings offer insight into Ottoman politics at a crucial juncture 
in Ottoman and Balkan history. Precisely because of LS's access to highly 
placed authorities in the central government and his knowledge of their 
sustained deliberations, his reports reveal how Ottoman officialdom perceived 
and reacted to the Greek insurgency, the subsequent impasse in Russian-
Ottoman affairs, and other aspects of the Eastern crisis. These descriptions 
also convey lively imagery of daily life in the capital. Their very specifici ty 
and urgency sharpens our focus on the multiple issues that marked an age of 
upheaval in the Ottoman Levant. In all these ways, the LS files highlight the 
value of archival discoveries for investigating the most significant happenings 
in Balkan, Ottoman, and Eastern Question history. 
January 2016 
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